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Two Steps Forward, One Step Back:
Must the District Court Issue a Stay
After a Decision Adverse to
Arbitration Is Appealed, and to What
Extent Are Arbitration Clauses
Applied Retroactively?
Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Contracting parties often agree to arbitration agreements to avoid the time,
expense, and procedure that permeate litigation in the United States court system.2
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1924 to "ensure the va-
lidity and enforcement of arbitration agreements."3 FAA §§ 4 and 206 empower
courts to compel arbitration of valid agreements according to their terms, and
FAA § 3 compels courts to stay litigation of an issue until it has been arbitrated.4
FAA § 16(a)(1) provides that an appeal may be taken following either a denial of
a § 4 motion to compel arbitration or a refusal of a § 3 motion to stay litigation.s
However, § 16(a)(1) does not address the fate of the litigation after a § 16(a)(1)
appeal has been made. In other words, § 3 compels a court to stay litigation after
finding that a matter is properly referable to arbitration, but the issue remains
whether courts are required to stay litigation when the matter's reference to arbi-
tration is itself in dispute. This procedural quagmire is a large and vigorously liti-
gated gap in the FAA, and federal appellate court decisions have fallen on both
sides of the divide.6 In Levin v. Alms & Associates, Inc., the Fourth Circuit of the
U.S. Court of Appeals found that if a district court denies a motion to compel
1. Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2011).
2. See Bradford-Scott Data Corp, Inc. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 506
(7th Cir. 1997); see also Levin, 634 F 3d at 264-65.
3. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2011). The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted by Congress in 1924 to
cnsure the validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements." JON 0. SHIMABUKURO, CONG.
RESEARCH SERv., RL30934, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2003), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531
/mctacrs3879/ml/1/high res d/RL30934_2003Augl5.pdf; see also H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68h Cong., 1'
Scss., 1 (1924).
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4, 206.
5. Id. § 16(a)(1).
6. Levin, 634 F.3d 260.
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arbitration, the district court is automatically divested of jurisdiction to continue
litigation while the denial is being appealed.
The Levin court also decided an important substantive issue in the arbitration
context when it found that if a contract contains both an integration clause and an
arbitration agreement, the presence of the integration clause can retroactively bind
the parties to arbitration.8 From its inception, the FAA was intended to put arbi-
tration agreements on "equal footing" with other contracts, but many courts to this
day view arbitration agreements with a heightened skepticism.9 The Levin court,
by finding that an arbitration agreement can be applied retroactively in the same
manner as other types of contracts, may have upheld the express purpose of the
FAA, but its decision may exceed the intended scope of the rule of law created
and generate unwelcome consequences.
By creating new rules to fill in the gaps left by the FAA, the federal circuit
courts may have muddied the waters of how and why parties assent to arbitration,
and the ramifications of their decisions could change how and why parties bind
themselves and each other to arbitration in the future.o This note will address
these issues in six remaining parts. Part II will briefly outline the pertinent facts
of Levin." Part III addresses the circuit split on whether federal courts should
issue an automatic stay of legislation pending an appeal to compel arbitration
under § 16(a)(1)(A) of the FAA. 12 Further, this part concerns the retroactive ap-
plication of arbitration clauses in continuing relationships, and analyzes the man-
ner in which some federal circuits have pieced together rules of contract interpre-
tation with Supreme Court precedent regarding arbitration to arrive at the result
ultimately reached by the Fourth Circuit in Levin.13 Part IV addresses how the
Levin court applied the law to the facts of the case and its reasons for doing so.14
Part V contains the author's own opinions and observations of the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Levin: that the Fourth Circuit was correct in its decision requiring au-
tomatic stays after a § 16(a)(1)(A) appeal, and that its decision regarding the cir-
cumstances under which arbitration clauses can be applied retroactively unneces-
sarily broadened the rules of contract interpretation for contracts containing arbi-
tration agreements.15 Part VI closes the note with a summary of the issues ad-
dressed and some final thoughts on how Levin strengthened federal precedent in
favor of arbitrability.16
7. Id. at 263-65.
8. Id. at 269.
9. H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess., I (1924).
10. See infra sections il(B), IV, and V(B).
I1. 634 F.3d 260; see infra section 11.
12. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (2006); See infra section Ill(A). Section 3 of the FAA requires that any
U.S. court, "upon being satisfied that the issue involved... is referable to arbitration.. shall on applica-
tion of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had...." 9 U.S.C. § 3.
13. 634 F.3d 260; see infra section Ill(B).
14. 634 F.3d 260; see infra section IV.
15. 634 F.3d 260; see infra section V.
16. 634 F.3d 260; see infra section VI.
246 [Vol. 2012
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2004, Eric M. Levin hired Alms & Associates, Inc. for financial advise-
ment.' 7 In each of the following three years, Levin entered into a new contract
with Alms & Associates.' 8 The final agreement in 2007 contained an arbitration
clause' 9 extending to "[a]ny dispute," as well as an integration clause 20 stating that
the contract "encompass[ed] and embod[ied] all terms, understandings, and
agreements," between the two parties.2 1 In 2009, Levin sued Alms & Associates
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for breach of con-
tract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940.22
Alms & Associates filed a motion in the district court to either dismiss the
case or to stay litigation pending arbitration, arguing that the contract executed in
2007 subjected all of Levin's claims, before and after 2007, to arbitration. 23 The
district court found that the arbitration agreement in the 2007 contract was worded
in such a way that it should have been applied only to claims that arose after that
agreement was executed.24 Alms & Associates filed notice of appeal in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and moved the district court to stay litiga-
tion pending appeal.25 This motion was denied in part, allowing discovery to
proceed for claims accruing prior to the 2007 contract. 26 Alms & Associates then
petitioned the appellate court to stay proceedings in the district court.27 This mo-
tion was granted soon thereafter by a temporary order, pending resolution of the
motion to stay on its merits. 28
After hearing oral arguments on the motion to stay proceedings in the district
court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Alms & Associates' argu-
ment that the general rule requiring divestiture of the district court's jurisdiction
upon appeal applies when an issue of arbitrability is appealed. 29 The court of
17. Levin, 634 F.3d at 261.
18. Id The contracts were titled "CFO Advisory Agreements."
19. The arbitration clause read in full: "Any dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration before
a single arbitrator in Howard County, Maryland, under the rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association, and the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties." Id at
266-67.
20. The integration clause read in full: "It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that this
agreement encompasses and embodies all terms, understandings and agreements by and between those
parties and the terms may not be amended except in writing by the parties hereto." Id. at 266.
21. Id. at 266. The 2004, 2005, and 2006 agreements did not contain arbitration agreements.
22. Id. at 262; Levin alleged in his complaint that Alms & Associates failed to disclose that they
were paid consultants for a land development company in which they advised Levin to invest over
$500,000, that Alms & Associates had reason to believe that the land development company had
financial difficulties, that Alms & Associates failed to disclose a commission received by them for
placing Levin's investment account with an outside firm, failed to reduce their fees based on the com-
mission with the outside firm. and misled Levin into loaning Alms & Associates money under disfa-
vorable terms. Id.; see The Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2011).
23 Levin, 634 F.3d at 261. Alms & Associates argued that the arbitration and integration clauses,
taken together, dictated that Levin's claims be addressed in arbitration. See supra notes 3 and 4.





29. Id. at 265-66.
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appeals joined the majority of jurisdictions in its determination that because the
continuation of proceedings in the district court is involved in an appeal to deter-
mine arbitrability, the district court was divested of jurisdiction to proceed with
litigation following such an appeal. 30 The court of appeals then noted an excep-
tion to this rule in cases where the district court has certified that the appeal is
frivolous or has been forfeited.3 1 Because the district court expressly found Alms
& Associates' appeal not to be frivolous, the appellate court granted its motion to
stay further proceedings in the district court until resolution of the issue of arbitra-
bility.32
On the issue of the arbitrability of Levin's pre-2007 claims, the court of ap-
peals found that because the Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA33 to establish
a presumption of arbitrability as a matter of federal policy, when a contract or
clause is open to interpretation on the issue of arbitrability, resolution should be
made in favor of arbitrability. 34 Therefore, the court of appeals held, when parties
contract to arbitrate "any dispute" or "all disputes," the arbitration clause applies
retroactively.3 5  The case was remanded to the district court to be decided in a
manner consistent with the appellate court's determination that Levin's claims
arising before 2007 were subject to arbitration.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Automatic Stays in the District Court Following an Arbitrability Appeal
The FAA provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken from an order refusing a
stay of any action [pending arbitration] under section 3 of [the FAA]." However,
the FAA does not provide a rule dictating whether the district court should stay
proceedings during such an appeal. The general rule, set out by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co.,38 is that an appeal "confers
jurisdiction on the court of appeal and divests the district court of its control over
those aspects of the case involved in the appeal."39 The federal circuits have split
on whether the merits of a case are involved in an appeal from a denial to compel
arbitration in such a way as to divest the district court of jurisdiction over them.40
30. Id. at 263-65. In addition, the court of appeals found that if district courts retained jurisdiction to
allow litigation during an arbitrability appeal, underlying principles of arbitration (time and cost effi-
ciency) would be defeated.
31 Id. at 266. The court also found that if the district court did certify the appeal as frivolous of
forfeited, then the party seeking arbitration is able to appeal the certification and move the appellate
court to stay proceedings in the district court pending the outcome of the review of the certification.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 3 for more background on the FAA.
34. Id. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr Co., 460
U.S. 1 (1983).
35 Levin, 634 F.3d at 269.
36. Id.
37. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A); see supra note 9
38. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. See Ehleiter v. Grapetrec Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2007); McCauley v. Halliburton
Energy Scrvs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005), Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d
1249 (11 th Cir. 2004); Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d
[Vol. 2012248
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The majority of circuits deciding the issue have held that the question of whether
the case can proceed on the merits is essentially the contrapositive of the question
of whether the case should be arbitrated, which is why one court called proceeding
on the merits "the mirror image" of the question of whether a dispute should be
arbitrated.4 1 If this is true, then pursuant to the Griggs rule, the district court must
stay proceedings following an appeal from a denial to compel arbitration. 42 This
is the position adopted by the Third, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits,
and now, following Levin, the Fourth Circuit.43 The Second and Ninth Circuits
have, conversely, determined that a district court need not stay its own proceed-
ings following such an appeal.44
The first federal circuit to issue a ruling on the question of whether litigation
should be stayed in the lower court pending an appeal of arbitrability was the
Ninth, in Britton v. Co-op Banking Group.45 In Britton, one of the defendants
appealed the district court's denial of a motion to stay pending his appeal of the
district court's refusing to compel arbitration.46 It is worth noting that the court in
Britton had no incentive to evaluate, as did the Seventh Circuit, the possibility of
duplicative adjudication that resulted from its decision. The district court in Brit-
ton had already entered a default judgment against the defendant, so no further
litigation would proceed in the district court absent a stay, which foreclosed the
possibility of duplicative proceedings. 47
The defendant in Britton relied on Griggs in his argument that the district
court was divested of jurisdiction upon an appeal from a denial of a motion to
compel arbitration.48 The court rejected the argument, and found that Supreme
Court precedent provided that "arbitrability is easily severable from merits of
underlying dispute," and therefore, because "the issue of arbitrability was the only
substantive issue presented in th[e] appeal, the district court was not divested of
jurisdiction to proceed with the case on the merits." 49 The court stressed in its
reasoning that if it was to decide that proceedings in the district court were auto-
matically stayed pending an appeal on arbitrability, then defendants would have at
their disposal the opportunity to bring a motion to compel arbitration for the sole
504 (7th Cir. 1997); and Bombardicr Corp. v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp., 2002 U.S. App LEXIS
25858 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion). See also Edward L. Jones Ill, Stop in the Name
ofArbitration: Should Trial in District Court Continue While Court ofAppeals Decides Arbitrability?,
92 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1129-1130 (2007).
41. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505.
42. Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 661 F.3d 904, 908 (5th Cir. 2011).
43. See Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 207; McCauley, 413 F.3d at 1158; Blinco, 366 F.3d at 1249; Bradford-
Scott, 128 F.3d at 504; Bombardier Corp., 2002 App LEXIS at 25858; and Levin v. Alms & Assocs.,
Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 260 (4th Cir. 2011).
44. See Britton v. Co-Op Banking Group, 916 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1990); Motorola Credit Corp. v.
Uzan, 388 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2004); and Weingarten Realty Investors, 661 F.3d 904.
45. Britton, 916 F.2d at 1405.
46. Id. at 1407, 1409.
47. Id. at 1407-08, 1414. Similarly, in Motorola Credit Corp., the party seeking arbitration had
already been the subject of a judgment on the merits in the district court when they appealed the stay to
the appellate court. They claimed that the district court lacked jurisdiction after their initial appeal
from the denial of arbitration, and therefore were requesting that the appellate court "undo" the trial in
the district court. Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d at 42, 54.
48. Britton, 916 F.2d at 1411.
49. Id. at 1412.
No. 1] 249
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purpose of stalling litigation in the district court.50 The court noted that because
the district court had discretion to stay proceedings, but was not required to, the
issue was properly addressed.
However, the circuit courts that have adopted the rule of automatic divestiture
following an appeal from a denial to compel arbitration have dealt with this issue
in a different way.52  Adopting the rules on interlocutory appeals for double-
jeopardy and qualified immunity, the majority circuits have held that the appellee
may petition the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal as frivolous.5 1 If the dis-
trict court did find that the appeal was frivolous, then it had discretion to decide
whether to stay or continue litigation while the appeal was pending.54
In one such case, Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer
Network, Inc.," the federal district court determined that the dispute between the
parties was not subject to arbitration, and refused to grant a motion to stay litiga-
tion pending the subsequent appeal on arbitrability.5 6 On appeal from the district
court's denial of the motion to stay, the Seventh Circuit determined that the filing
of an appeal from a district court's decision to deny a motion to compel arbitration
automatically divested the district court of jurisdiction over the underlying
claims.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rested its decision on two principles.
First, it decided that the issue of whether the case can proceed on the merits in the
district court is involved in an arbitrability appeal in such a way as to divest the
district court of jurisdiction under the general rule that an appeal "confers jurisdic-
tion on the court of appeal and divests the district court of its control over those
aspects of the case involved in the appeal".5 8 Second, given the benefits sought by
the parties who have entered into an arbitration agreement, proceeding on the
merits in two forums (judicial and arbitral) would undermine the purpose of enter-
ing into such an agreement.5 9
To support its holding on the first principle, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated that the question of whether a case can be heard on its merits in the
district court is identical to the issue of whether the appellate court should reverse
the decision of the district court refusing to compel arbitrationi 0 The court ad-
dressed the Ninth Circuit's holding on this issue in Britton,6 1 that "arbitrability is
50. Id.
5 1. Id.
52. See Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504 (7th Cir.
1997); see also McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Scrvs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158.
53. See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506. See also supra note 40
54. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506.
55. Id. at 504.
56. Id. at 505.
57. Id. at 505-07.
58. Id. at 505; Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).
59. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506. The court stated further that because parties enter into arbitra-
tion agreements to effect efficient and expedient dispute resolution (avoid litigation), "cases of this
kind are. . poor candidates for exceptions to the principle that a notice of appeal divest the district
court of power to proceed with the aspects of the case that have been transferred to the court of ap-
peals." Id.
60. Id. at 505. "[wjhether the case should be litigated in the district court... is the mirror image of
the question presented on [an appeal from a denial to compel arbitration]." Id.
61. Britton v. Co-Op Banking Group, 916 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1990).
250 [Vol. 2012
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distinct from the merits of the litigation," and therefore an arbitrability appeal
does not divest the district court of jurisdiction, stating that while "[t]he premise
may be correct, . . . the conclusion does not follow ... .Whether the litigation may
go forward in the district court is precisely what the court of appeals must de-
cide."62
On the second point, concerning the practical consequences of following the
Ninth and Second Circuits, the Seventh Circuit was particularly concerned with
the effect of duplicative proceedings.63 First, proceeding in the lower court would
present the problem of inconsistent outcomes from the judicial and the arbitral
tribunal, should the appellate court find the issue in the district court to in fact be
arbitrable. 4 In addition, the cost- and time-saving goals of arbitration clauses
would be defeated if, for example, the case was litigated in the district court dur-
ing the appeal and subsequently found by the appellate court to be subject to arbi-
tration.65 In this case, the dispute, already litigated erroneously, would be arbitrat-
ed, and then possibly return to a judicial forum for enforcement of the arbitration
award.66
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Levin v. Alms, overlooked neither of
the previously mentioned cases when making their decision, and paid close atten-
tion to the reasoning behind the decisions of both the Ninth Circuit and Seventh
Circuit on the issue of divestiture of jurisdiction after a § 16(a)(1)(A) appeal.67
Given the circuit split, the issue of whether the district court has jurisdiction
to proceed on the merits after a motion to stay pending an appeal on the issue of
arbitrability is not an issue that has been resolved completely. This point is made
clear by the most recent federal court of appeals case, Weingarten Realty Investors
v. Miller,68 which addresses the reasoning of the majority circuits in their disaf-
firmations of the decisions of the minority circuits. In Weingarten Realty Inves-
tors, a real estate developer (Miller) defaulted on a loan provided to him by a real
estate finance company (Weingarten).69 Miller moved in the district court to
compel arbitration, and the motion was denied.70 Miller then moved in the district
court for a stay pending appeal, which was also denied.
On appeal from the denial of the motion to stay, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that a district court is not required to automatically issue a stay
pending an appeal from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration. 72 The court
based its holding on what it called a "narrow" application of the Griggs rule.73 In
doing so, it applied the holding of the U.S Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone that
the issue of arbitrability "is easily severable from the merits of the underlying
62. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506 (citing Britton, 916 F.2d at 1405). Britton used Moses as sup-
port for its holding.
63. Id. at 505-506.
64. Id. at 505. "Continuation of proceedings in the distnct court ... creates a risk of inconsistent
handlings of the case by two tribunals."
65. Id. at 506.
66. Id.
67. Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 266-269 (4th Cir. 2011).
68. Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 661 F.3d 904 (5th Cir. 2011).




73. Id. at 906.
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disputes," and decided that for an issue to be "involved in an appeal" in such a
way as to divest the district court of jurisdiction over it, that issue must be one that
would be decided in the district and appellate courts simultaneously, if the district
court retained jurisdiction.4 According to the court, because "a determination on
the arbitrability of a claim... does not itself decide the merits," the district court
retained discretion as to whether to grant or deny a motion to stay pending appeal
from a denial to compel arbitration.s The court also addressed the analogous
treatment given by the majority circuits to the manner in which, and the reasons
why, districts courts lose jurisdiction following an appeal on the grounds of quali-
fied immunity and double-jeopardy. It found that the automatic stays granted in
these cases were distinguishable from arbitration cases in that they are constitu-
tional guarantees of immunity.77
Weingarten Realty Investors, along with the other minority circuits, employ
the traditional four-factor test to determine when a stay should be granted under
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hilton v. Braunskill.7 8 Applying
this test, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Miller's claim that he
would "be required to incur the time and expense of litigation and may lose the
cost saving benefits of arbitration," was not an irreparable injury.79 Contrary to
the holdings of the majority circuits, the Fifth Circuit stated, "we reject the idea
that arbitration ensures substantial speed and cost savings."so
B. Arbitration Agreement + Integration Clause = Retroactive Application?
In Levin, the Fourth Circuit pieced together an array of Supreme Court and
circuit court precedent to reach their conclusion that because a 2007 contract con-
taining an arbitration agreement also contained an integration clause, the arbitra-
tion agreement applied to contracts of the previous three years, despite the fact
that the pre-2007 contracts contained no arbitration language.81 The court first
sought to determine what language in the contract was to be applied in their analy-
sis, and then needed to decide what deference to give that language.82 The court
then needed to decide whether the contract containing both arbitration and integra-
tion clauses applied to claims arising before its execution.8 3
In Universal Concrete Products v. Turner Const. Co., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit decided that the appropriate interpretation of a con-
tract containing provisions seeming to be in conflict, was, if the provisions can




78 Id at 908; The four factor test is as follows "[Wlhether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the ments; whether the applicant will be irreparably injured
absent a stay; whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and where the public interest lies." Id. at 910.
79. Id. at 910.
80. Id. However, in a footnote, the court points out that absent a stay, the parties could be forced to
participate in discovery, disclosing potentially damaging information, and incurnng additional costs,
which could potentially be considered irreparable injuries. Id. at n. 19.
81. Levin v. Alms & Assocs, Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2011).
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"comfortably be read together," to combine the two provisions." In Universal,
Turner Construction Company was hired by a property owner as the general con-
tractor for a construction project, and hired Universal as a subcontractor." The
subcontract between Turner and Universal included language that incorporated the
original contract between Turner and the property owner by reference.8 6  The
subcontract contained a "pay-when-paid agreement", expressly providing that
Turner was not required to pay Universal unless the property owner had paid
Turner.8 7 However, Universal claimed that the original contract between Turner
and the property owner conflicted with the pay-when-paid clause in the subcon-
tract, and therefore the contract as a whole was ambiguous.8 8
The court of appeals held that "whether one of ... two purportedly conflict-
ing provisions controls is irrelevant where, as here... two provisions can be com-
fortably read together."89 As a result, no ambiguity existed as to the pay-when-
paid arrangement between the parties, and the court of appeals affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court, enforcing the pay-when-paid agreement. 90 It was this
"read together" approach that the Levin court took when deciding the proper inter-
pretation of a contract with an arbitration agreement and an integration clause.9 '
In AT&T Tech. v. Commc'n Workers of Am.,92 The United States Supreme
Court made clear the federal policy favoring arbitration.93 In this case, the parties
disputed whether certain layoffs were arbitrable under a collective-bargaining
agreement ("CBA").94 Article 8 of the CBA provided that differences between the
parties over the interpretation of the agreement were to be arbitrated.9 5 Article 9
provided, in relevant part, that termination of employees was not subject to the
arbitration clause in Article 8.96 Article 20 provided the sequence in which em-
ployees were to be laid off "when a lack of work" required AT&T to do so.9
Following a decision by AT&T to lay off seventy-nine union members, the
union claimed AT&T had violated Article 20 because there was no lack of work
in the area, and sought to take their grievance to arbitration." AT&T claimed that
under Article 9 of the CBA, decisions regarding termination of employees were
not subject to arbitration. 99  The case eventually reached the United States Su-
84. Universal Concrete Products Corp. v. Turner Constr. Co., 595 F.3d 527, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2010).
85. Id. at 528-29.
86. Id at 528-29. The dispute arose when the construction project fell apart, and the property owner
had not paid Turner. Id.
87. Id at 530. In Virginia, this arrangement is called a "pay-when-paid agreement." Id.
88. Id at 530. Under Virginia state law, an ambiguous pay-when-paid clause is unenforeeable. Id. at
529-30. According to Universal, two provisions in the contract between Turner and the property owner
conflicted with one another, and the one that controlled, when applied to the subcontract, created an
ambiguity as to whether the arrangement was or was not pay-when-paid. Id at 531.
89. Id. at 530.
90. Id. at 531-32.
91. Levin v. Alms & Assocs, Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 267 (4th Cir. 2011).
92. AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 106 U.S. 643 (1986).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 644.
95. Id. at 645.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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preme Court, which declined to interpret the CBA. 00 However, it did consolidate
previous rules of law regarding the interpretation of arbitration clauses. 0 1 The
Court found that when a contract includes an arbitration clause, a presumption of
arbitrability exists, and "doubts should be resolved in favor of [arbitration]," un-
less it is clear and certain that the particular issue should not be subject to the arbi-
tration clause.102 Further, the court found that the presumption applies even more
so to broad arbitration clauses. 0 3
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in Cara's No-
tions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.' 04 turned on the presumption of arbitrability set
out in AT&T Technologies.'0 5 In Cara's Notions, the owners of a Hallmark store
entered into a contract with Hallmark concerning the licensing and operation of
the store. 0 6 This contract contained no arbitration clause. 0 7 However, four years
later, the storeowners and Hallmark executed a second contract for a second store,
which did contain an arbitration agreement. 08 After Hallmark allegedly breached
the agreement under the first contract, Cara's Notions brought suit against them
for breach of contract.' 09 Hallmark responded by moving to compel arbitration
pursuant to the terms of the second contract.1 0 The district court denied Hall-
mark's motion to compel arbitration, holding that because the issue involved the
first store, only the first contract applied to the dispute, and the terms of the se-
cond contract did not mandate that the claim be arbitrated."' On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit found that the arbitration clause in the second contract did in fact
require the dispute to be arbitrated.1 2 The court specifically addressed the "any
controversy or claim" language in the arbitration clause, and held that it was broad
enough to warrant application to conflicts arising under the first contract, paying
due regard to the "federal policy favoring arbitra[tion]."l 3
In another case addressing retroactive application of arbitration agreements,
Hendrick v. Brown & Root, Inc.,"l4 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia heard a case that would be relied on by the district court in
Levin when it decided that the arbitration clause in the 2007 contract between
Levin and Alms & Associates did not apply to claims that arose before its execu-
100. Id at 651.
101. Id. at 650.
102. Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-
83 (1960)).
103. Id "Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause is as broad as the one em-
ployed in this case." Id. Article 8 stated that "any differences arising out with respect to the interpreta-
tion of this contract . . . shall ... be referred ... to an impartial arbitrator." Id. at 645, n. 1.
104. 140 F.3d 566 (4th Cir. 1998).
105. Id at 571-72.
106. Id at 568.
107. Id
108. Id. The arbitration agreement stated in relevant part: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, or any aspects of the relationship between Hallmark




112. Id. at 569, 571.
113. Id at 571 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymoth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985)).
114. 50 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 1999).
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tion." 5 In Hendrick, Brown & Root, Inc. employed an electrician, Hendrick, on
four different occasions over a period of five years to complete specific jobs."6
He was formally terminated after each job was completed, and underwent exten-
sive application procedures before entering each term of employment."' After
Henrick was terminated from the third job, and before he was hired for the fourth,
Brown & Root, Inc. established a "Dispute Resolution Program" (DRP), under
which employees agreed to arbitrate any claims against them." 8 The DRP agree-
ment was included as a condition of employment in the fourth contract, and by its
terms was every bit as broad as those in AT&T and Levin."'9 When Hendrick sued
Brown & Root, Inc. for alleged tortious conduct that occurred during his third
period of employment, Brown & Root, Inc. moved to compel arbitration based on
the DRP.120 The court denied the motion on the basis that the DRP did not go into
effect until after the incident had occurred, and that the parties evinced no intent to
arbitrate the claim at that time, or by the terms of the fourth contract.121 Invoking
the caveat of the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T that the presumption in favor
of arbitrability does not apply if "it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute," the court found that the arbitration clause did not apply retroactively.122
The Hendrick court also distinguished a decision by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Zink v. Merrill Lynch 23 , in which an arbitration clause was given
retroactive effect.124 The difference between Zink and Hendrick, the court found,
was that in Zink, the transaction at issue was "part and parcel of the ongoing busi-
ness relationship between the parties." 25 Because Hendrick was formally termi-
nated and re-hired after each job, the court found, such a relationship did not exist
between him and Brown & Root, Inc., and therefore Zink did not support Brown
& Root Inc.'s proposition that the DRP should be applied retroactively.' 26
The cases discussed above represent the myriad of cases the Fourth Circuit
examined to direct their analysis of the issue of whether a contract containing both
an arbitration agreement and an integration clause subjects disputes arising before
the contract was executed to arbitration.127 The Fourth Circuit ultimately used the
115. Levin v. Alms & Assocs., 634 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2011).
116. Hendrick v. Brown & Root, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528-29 (E.D. Va. 1999).
117. Id. at 529-30.
118. Id. at 529.
119. Id. at 529-30. The agreement encompassed "any legal or equitable claim, demand or controver-
sy .. . which relates to, arises from, concerns or involves in any way: (1) this Plan; (2) the employment
of any employee ... or (4) any other matter related to the relationship between the employee and the
Company" (emphasis in original); AT&T Techs. Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643
(1986); Levin, 634 F.3d at 266-67.
120. Hendrick, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 528-30.
121. Id at 534.
122. Id. at 534 (citing AT&T Techs., 106 U.S. at 650).
123. Zink v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 13 F.3d 330 (10th Cir. 1993).
124. Hendrick,50 F. Supp. 2d at 536. In Zink, a bond salesman and his client agreed to arbitrate "any
controversy between us arising out of your business or this agreement," after the bond purchase at
issue in the suit. See Zink, 13 F.3d at 331 (arbitration clause applied retroactively).
125. Hendrick, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
126. Id.
127. Levin v. Alms & Assocs., 634 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2011). See also J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v.
Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1988) (broad application of arbitration agree-
ment); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (an agreement to arbitrate "any claim or
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presumption of arbitrability from AT&T, the rule of contract interpretation from
Universal, and the example set by Cara's Notions, to decide that the 2007 contract
between Levin and Alms & Associates applied retroactively. 128
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc.,129 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit expressly decided to follow the position of the majority of circuits, holding
that in an appeal from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration, the district court
is automatically divested of jurisdiction over the underlying claims.130 The court
found that because the issue before the court on an arbitrability appeal is whether
the district court should move forward with litigation of the underlying claims,
pursuant to the general rule that the district court is divested of jurisdiction over
issues involved in the appeal, the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on
the merits following an appeal from its denial to compel arbitration., 3 ' The court
also noted that because the parties' intention when entering into an agreement to
arbitrate is to save both time and money, allowing litigation to continue in the
district court while the issue of arbitrability is being appealed would undermine
the principal purposes of arbitration. 32 In the instant case, the only aspect of the
case that the district court allowed to continue while arbitrability was being ap-
pealed was discovery.' 33 However, the fourth circuit saw no reason why even that
process should be permitted to proceed, finding that if the court of appeals found
the issues being litigated to in fact be arbitrable, the parties would not be able to
"unring any bell rung by discovery."' 34
The Levin court also adopted the frivolousness exception espoused by the cir-
cuits accepting the automatic divestiture rule. ' Specifically, it adopted the pro-
cedure set out by the Tenth Circuit that the appellee may seek to have the district
court certify the appellant's appeal as frivolous.136 If the appeal is determined to
be frivolous by the district court, the appellant may then challenge that determina-
disputc relating to or arising out of this agreement or the services provided" applies retroactively);
Zink, 13 F.3d 330 (an agreement to arbitrate "any controversy between [the parties] arising out of
[plaintiffs] business or this agreement" applies retroactively); Cocnen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453
F.3d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972) (an agreement to arbitrate "any controversy between. . . members" applies
retroactively); Peerless Importers, Inc. v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union Local One, 903
F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1990) (agreement to arbitrate issues "arising under this agreement and its term" does
not apply retroactively).
128. Levin, 634 F.3d 260; AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986);
Universal Concrete Products Corp. v. Turner Constr. Co., 595 F.3d 527 (4th Cir. 2010); Cara's No-
tions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d 566 (4th Cir. 1998).
129. Levin, 634 F.3d 260.
130. Id at 264-66.
131. Id at 264, 266.
132. Id at 263-66.
133. Id. at 264-65.
134. Id
135. Id. at 265-66. See Ehlciter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2007); McCauley v.
Halliburton Energy Svs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005); Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC,
366 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004); Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc.,
128 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1997); and Bombardier Corp. v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp., 2002 App
LEXIS 25858 (D.C. Cir.).
136. Levin, 634 F.3d 265-66. See also McCauley, 413 F.3d at 1161-62.
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tion in the court of appeals.'37 The court noted that the idea behind the frivolous-
ness exception is preventing appellants from appealing for the sole purpose of
stalling litigation in the district court.138 Therefore, an appeal certified as frivo-
lous will not divest the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with trial on the
underlying claims.'39 In Levin, because the district court initially found that the
appeal was not frivolous, the court granted the motion to stay proceedings pending
the appeal on arbitrability.140 Therefore, the fourth circuit held, because proceed-
ing in the district court was an aspect in the case involved in the appeal, it was
subject to the general rule that the district court was divested of jurisdiction over
it.14' The court further determined that because the appeal was determined by the
district court not to be frivolous, the district court had denied the stay of litigation
pending appeal in error.' 42
Regarding whether the arbitration agreement in the 2007 contract between
Levin and Alms & Associates subjected claims accruing before 2007 to arbitra-
tion, the fourth circuit held that the agreement should be given retroactive applica-
tion.143 It began its analysis of the issue by stating that it would be applying the
"federal policy favoring arbitration,"'" and further, that if there were any question
as to whether the arbitration agreement should be enforced, then the answer would
be in favor of arbitration. 45
The fourth circuit court of appeals next addressed Levin's contention that the
arbitration agreement was narrower than the integration clause, and thus should
not have retroactive effect.146 Drawing on Universal, 147 the court held that it was
not necessary to come to a conclusion on the issue of which clause was narrower,
or which controlled, because the two could be combined easily and read togeth-
er.148 The language that was the subject of further analysis was "that the agree-
ment encompasses all terms, understandings, and agreements by and between
th[e] parties. . .and... [a]ny dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration."' 4 9
Applying the United States Supreme Court's rule stated in AT&T v. Commc 'n
Workers of Am.' 50 that the presumption of arbitrability carried special weight
when analyzing broad arbitration clauses, the Fourth Circuit found that the 2007
agreement extended to disputes arising between the parties prior to its execu-
tion.'5' The court went on, however, to support its conclusion with its own prece-
137. Levin, 634 F.3d at 265.
138. Id.; see also McCauley, 413 F.3d at 1161.
139. Levin, 634 F.3d 260.
140. Id at 266. The court also noted that this approach was in line with the Fourth Circuit's "dualjurisdiction doctrine" in double-jeopardy cases, which allows the district court to continue litigation
while the defendant appeals on the basis of double-jeopardy, if the district court has determined the
appeal to be frivolous. Id. at 265-66.
141. Id. at 266.
142. Id.
143. Id at 269.
144. Id at 266 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
145. Id.
146. Id at 267.
147. Universal Concrete Products Corp. v. Turner Constr. Co., 595 F.3d 527 (4th Cir. 2010).
148. Levin, 634 F.3d at 267; see also Universal Concrete Products, 595 F.3d 527.
149. Levin, 634 F.3d at 267.
150. AT&T Techs. Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
151. Levin, 634 F.3d at 267; see also AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650.
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dent, as well as that of other federal circuit courts of appeal.15 2 It noted that the
First, Second, and Tenth Circuits have also decided in favor of retroactive applica-
tion of broad arbitration clauses.'5 3 The court also distinguished a case relied
upon heavily by Levin, Hendrick v. Brown & Root, Inc.. 154 The court stated that
the case did not control because, unlike the instant case, the parties in Hendrick
had no ongoing business relationship.' 5 5 Because Levin and Alms & Associates
did have a continuous, uninterrupted relationship, the court said, the dispute be-
tween the parties was "part and parcel" of the ongoing relationship between them,
as opposed to being related solely to one contract. 5
Therefore, the court held, because of the strong federal policy favoring arbi-
tration, especially applied to broad arbitration clauses, the arbitration clause ex-
tended to any and all disputes between the parties, before and after the 2007 con-
tract was executed.'5 7 The district court's holding was reversed and remanded to
proceed in accordance with the opinion of the court of appeals. 5 8
V. COMMENT
In Levin, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals made two distinct decisions,
one procedural and one substantive, which furthered the efficiency goals of utiliz-
ing arbitration as a substitute for traditional litigation. 159 The procedural issue,
whether the district court must automatically stay litigation following an appeal
from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration, is particularly significant, as it
represents the sixth federal court of appeals to adopt an affirmative answer to the
above question.1 6 0 However, the substantive issue, whether a contract containing
both an arbitration agreement and an integration clause subjects claims accruing
prior to the execution of the contract to arbitration, is no less important.161 If there
was any question prior to this case as to the weight of the federal policy in favor
of arbitration, there is now, at least in the Fourth Circuit, a clear and satisfactory
answer.162
A. A Step in the Right Direction
Of the nine federal circuits courts of appeal that have decided the issue of
whether a district court is automatically divested of jurisdiction following an ap-
152. Levin, 634 F.3d at 267-68.
153. See Cara's Notions v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d 566 (4th Cir. 1998); Kristian v. Comcast
Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Zink v. Mcrll Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 13 F.3d 330 (10th
Cir. 2006); and Cocncn v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.3d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972).
154. Levin, 634 F.3d at 268-69 (citing Hendrick v. Brown & Root, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va.
1999)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 269.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 264-65.
160. See cases cited supra note 40.
161. See supra Parts Ill(B) and IV.
162. Levin, 634 F.3d at 266-67, 269.
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peal from a denial to compel arbitration, six have ruled in the affirmative.'63 Prior
to Weingarten Realty Investors (Weingarten), only one federal circuit had ruled
contrary to the majority rule in the past two decades.'6" Before Weingarten, the
argument could have been made that the minority rule was but an aberration.
However, that is no longer the case. The distinct federal circuit split on the issue,
coupled with the short interval of time that passed between Levin and Weingarten
reinvigorates the debate over which method of handling appeals from denials to
compel arbitration is in line with the intent of the FAA and the policies behind
arbitration in general.
The divide in the pre- Weingarten decisions is even more pronounced after
examining the procedural history of the Second and Ninth circuits. 165  In both
Britton and Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan (Uzan),166 representing the Ninth and
Second circuits (respectively), the trial in the district court was already over.167 In
fact, the Uzan court explicitly distinguished its decision from both Britton and the
majority circuits in that regard.168 The significance of this difference is that nei-
ther the Second Circuit in Uzan, nor the Ninth in Britton, had any reason whatso-
ever to take into account the efficiency and duplicity arguments that were so con-
vincing to the Seventh Circuit in Bradford-Scott (the first federal circuit court of
appeals to decide the issue in favor of divestiture), and the Fourth Circuit in Lev-
in.169 One could even go so far as to say that there was no circuit split - that is,
no federal circuit court of appeals had decided that the district court could not
continue with proceedings following an appeal from a denial to compel arbitra-
tion. However, this procedural distinction across the split no longer exists. In
Weingarten, as in Levin, the trial in the district court had not yet begun on its mer-
its.170 Interestingly, though, the decision in Weingarten very easily could have
come out the other way.
In Weingarten, after disposing of the matter of whether a stay in the district
court should be automatic, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit applied the traditional four-factor test governing discretionary stays.'7' When
the court got to the second factor, "whether [the party seeking arbitration] will
suffer irreparable injury without a stay," it found that missing out on the cost- and
time-saving aspects of arbitration does not constitute an irreparable injury, and
163. See cases cited supra note 40.
164. Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 661 F.3d 904, 907 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Motorola Credit
Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2004)).
165. See Britton v. Co-Op Banking Group, 916 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1990); Uzan, 388 F.3d at 44-46.
166. 388 F.3d 39.
167. See Britton, 916 F.2d at 1408; Uzan, 388 F.3d at 47.
168. "In no case has a Court of Appeals granted the relief that defendants now seek-undoing a trial
because the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed after an appeal from an order denying arbitra-
tion." Uzan, 388 F.3d at 54 (emphasis in original).
169. "Immediate appeal under § 16(a) helps to cut the loss from duplication. Yet combining the costs
of litigation and arbitration is what lies in store if a district court continues with the case while an
appeal under § 16(a) is pending." Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer Network,
Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 1997); "[A]llowing discovery to proceed would cut against the effi-
ciency and cost-saving purposes of arbitration." Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 264 (4th
Cir. 2011).
170. Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 661 F.3d 904, 907 (5th Cir. 2011); Levin, 634 F.3d at
261.
171. Weingarten Realty Investors, 661 F.3d at 910. See supra note 78 for the Hilton four-factor test.
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expressly rejected the notion that arbitrating a matter achieves those goalS. 172 A
closer look at the footnote to that statement, however, reveals that the Fifth Circuit
agrees with the Levin court's reasons why a stay should be automatically grant-
ed. It pointed out that engaging in discovery, which would occur absent an
automatic stay, could result in irreparable harm to the party seeking the stay be-
cause of the potential for substantial cost increases due to discovery, and more
importantly, the possibility of revealing sensitive information that could have an
adverse effect on the parties' right to arbitrate.174 As the Fourth Circuit put it in
Levin, litigants cannot "unring any bell rung by discovery." 75 However, the party
seeking arbitration had not brought this point to the court of appeals in his brief,
and the court deemed it to have been waived.' 76 Had the Weingarten court read
into the content of its own decision, it would have realized absent a stay, a matter
on appeal for arbitrability will almost always go to discovery, and the issues of
disclosing sensitive information and increased costs would thus be present in eve-
ry case of this kind. Therefore, by applying the four-factor test to stays pending
appeals of arbitrability, the result would always be "yes." The party seeking to
arbitrate would always suffer irreparable harm absent a stay, and thus a stay
should be automatically granted absent extenuating circumstances, as will be dis-
cussed below. 77
The most compelling argument against divestiture put forth by the minority
circuits is the risk of frivolous appeals for the purpose of stalling litigation.
However, the majority circuits have dealt with this issue in a way that furthers the
efficiency goals of arbitration.' 79  The Levin court adopted the Tenth Circuit's
fine-tuning of this rule, that the appellee may ask the district court at the outset of
the appeal to declare the appeal frivolous, which gives the district court discretion,
to an extent, to grant or deny a stay.s 0 If the district court does say that the appeal
is frivolous, the party seeking the appeal may then appeal the frivolousness deter-
mination.' 8' This procedural safeguard not only allows the trial court an amount
172. Weingarten Really Investors, 661 F.3d at 913. "For the reasons previously discussed, we reject
the idea that arbitration ensures substantial speed and cost savings." Id. However, the opinion lacks
any evidence of the "reasons" behind this statement. The only part of the opinion that could be con-
strued to support this statement is the exhaustive analysis the court gives to the arbitrability of the
claim itself.
173. Id. at 619 n.19.
174. Id. See also Levin, 634 F.3d at 264-65.
175. Levin, 634 F.3d at 265.
176. Weingarten Realty Investors, 661 F.3d at 619 n. 19.
177. Automatic stays also have been held to satisfy the fourth prong of the four-part test (where the
public interest lies). See, e.g., C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette
Sees. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 307, 310 (W.D. Tenn. 1989)("[Pjublic policy ... favors an efficient alloca-
tion ofjudicial resources.").
178. Britton v. Co-Op Banking Grp., 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990). "The rule urged by [the
appellant] would allow a defendant to stall a trial simply by brnging a fnvolous motion to compel
arbitration...[staying proceedings] is a proper subject for the exercise of discretion by the trial court."
Id.
179. "[Frivolous appeals are] a serious concern, but one met by the response that the appellee may ask
the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal as frivolous or to affirm summarily." Bradford-Scott Data
Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 1997).
180. Levin, 634 F.3d at 265 (discussing McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Scrvs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158,
1162 (10th Cir. 2005)).
181 Id. at 266.
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of discretion in the matter, but prevents the case from being heard on the merits
while the case is on appeal, whether the court of appeals is looking at the frivo-
lousness determination or the issue of arbitrability.18 2 To allow duplicative pro-
ceedings to take place is not only against the goals of arbitration and the purpose
of the FAA, but is also against the rule of divestiture set out by the United States
Supreme Court in Griggs.13
To better understand the circuit split, it might be helpful to ask "why" the mi-
nority circuits decided these cases the way that they did. Of course, like any other
decisions, they were applying the law to facts, but the existence of the split show
that there was, and is, another answer to the question of whether a district court
must stay proceedings after an appeal from a decision to denying a motion to
compel arbitration. There is evidence that the Ninth Circuit, which provided the
minority opinion to which the other minority circuits defer, is particularly hostile
to arbitration in general.'8 It is also possible that the facts and circumstances
surrounding the pre- Weingarten minority decisions indicate that the parties seek-
ing the stay were doing so out of frivolity, as a part of a last-ditch attempt to fore-
stall litigation.'8 5  In addition, all of the minority circuits take a narrow, literal
precedent out of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Moses H. Cone that "arbi-
trability is easily severable from [the] merits of [the] underlying dispute," an ap-
proach that the Seventh Circuit, in Bradford-Scott, dismissed.S8 The minority
circuits take a similarly narrow approach to the Griggs rule. 8 7  In contrast, the
majority circuits, as shown, have taken a more flexible approach to the issue, and,
despite the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit, an approach that is better suited for
arbitration issues, especially given the federal policy favoring arbitration, as dis-
cussed below.'8 8
The argument against allowing a district court to proceed on the merits after
an appeal on arbitrability is a common sense argument. The district court clearly
loses jurisdiction over the question of whether the case should be arbitrated fol-
lowing an appeal on the issue. 8 9 Why then, should the district court be allowed to
continue litigating a matter while the court of appeals is deciding whether it may
do so at all? For this very reason, the majority of federal circuits have decided
182. At least one commentator has explored the idea that district courts in minority circuits apply the
frivolity rule in deciding whether to grant discretionary stays, and argues that this standard should be
formally adopted, as the majority circuits have. See Michael P. Winkler, Comment, Interlocutory
Appeals Under the Federal Arbitration Act and the Effect on the District Court's Proceedings, 59
OKLA. L. REV. 597, 636 (2006).
183. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505-06.
184. Winkler, supra note 182, at 606 n 85, 631 n. 326.
185. Id at 630-32.
186. Britton v. Co-Op Banking Group, 916 F.2d 1405, 1412, n.7 (9th Cir. 1990); Weingarten Realty
Investors v. Miller, 661 F.3d 904, 909 (5th Cir. 2011); Bradford-Scott Data Corp., 128 F.3d at 506
("The premise may be correct, but the conclusion [that an appeal concerning arbitrability does not
affect proceedings to resolve the merits] does not follow.")(emphasis added).
187. Weingarten Realty Investors, 661 F.3d at 908 ("The Ninth Circuit interpreted Griggs narrowly, .
. [and] the Seventh Circuit interpreted Griggs broadly .... The narrower interpretation better com-
ports with our precedents and the nature of arbitration.").
188. See supra note 40.
189. "[Ilt is fundamental to a hierarchical judiciary that "a federal district court and a federal court of
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this issue correctly. 190 To conclude that the district court may proceed on the mer-
its of a case that's very existence in the district court is being appealed is not only
engaging in hair-splitting, it promotes inefficiency and uncertainty, the very prob-
lems that arbitration that the FAA were created to solve.' 9'
B. Retroactive Application: Arbitrary Arbitration?
The decision by the Fourth Circuit in Levin to apply the arbitration agreement
in the 2007 contract retroactively is not groundbreaking in and of itself. Broad
arbitration clauses have been given retroactive effect across different circuits, in
line with traditional rules of contract interpretation, Supreme Court precedent, and
federal policy.192 However, in Levin, the Fourth Circuit combined this trend with
their rule of interpretation in Universal'93 and the Supreme Court's rule that "any
doubt concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration," to arrive at the narrow conclusion that arbitration language, coupled
with integration language, binds the parties to arbitration retroactively for issues
arising before the execution of the arbitration contract.' 94
The ramifications of the Fourth Circuit's decision on this issue are slightly
troubling. Putting the pieces of the contract together to bind parties to arbitration,
in essence stripping them of their right to trial, should not be as simple as invoking
"federal policy" to tip the scales in favor of arbitration. The procedure of interpre-
tation utilized by the Levin court provides sophisticated parties with an opportuni-
ty to "trap" the unwary into signing away their rights to trial. Integration language
is present in many, if not most contracts, and is the kind of boilerplate language
that is often easily glossed over by consumers. 195 One practice-oriented article
suggests that a drafter can achieve retroactive application of an arbitration agree-
ment simply by making slight modifications to their standard integration clause.1 96
190. See supra note 40.
191. See Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2011). "The core subject of an
arbitrability appeal is the challenged continuation of proceedings before the district court on the under-
lying claims. Therefore, because the district court lacks jurisdiction over 'those aspects of the case
involved in the appeal,' it must necessarily lack jurisdiction over the continuation of any proceedings
relating to the claims at issue." Id. at 264 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S.
56, 58 (1982)); see also Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505 ("[wlhether the case should be litigated in the
district court is.. .the mirror image of the question presented on appeal"). See also Roger J. Perlstadt,
Interlocutory Review of Litigation-Avoidance Claims. Insights From Appeals Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 44 AKRON L. REV. 375 (2011). For a detailed analysis of the economic impacts of the
decisions of the split circuits, and an argument against granting automatic stays, see Gabrical Taran,
Comment, Towards a Sensible Rule Governing Stays Pending Appeals ofDenials ofArbitration, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 399, 421-423 (2006).
192. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 33-36 (1st Cir. 2006); Zink v. Merrill Lynch Pierce
Fenner & Smith, 13 F.3d 330, 332 (10th Cir. 2006); Cocnen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.3d 1209,
1212 (2d Cir. 1972); J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 319-320
(4th Cir. 1988); Cara's Notions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d 566, 571-72 (4th Cir. 1998).
193 Levin, 634 F.3d at 267 (discussing Universal Concrete Products Corp. v. Turner Constr. Co., 595
F.3d 527 (4th Cir. 2010)).
194. Id. at 266-69 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mcm'l Hosp v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983)).
195. 11 Richard A. Lord, WILLIsTON ON CONTRACTS § 33:21 (4th ed. 1990).
196. Shawn Bates & David Hricik, Arbitration Clauses for Ongoing Relationships, 42 FEB HOuS.
LAW. 10, 15-16 (2005).
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However, the article also suggests using language indicating that prior agreements
between the parties are superseded by the contract containing the arbitration
clause, language that was neither present nor implied in the Levin contract.197 The
use of integration clauses to bind parties to arbitration, however, is especially
troubling. If, as in the Levin contract, the arbitration language is separated from
the integration language, it is not difficult to see how one might not put together
that they are effectively signing away their right to trial for everything that has
ever transpired between themselves and the party they are contracting with.' 98
However, by indiscriminately applying its "read together" rule from Universal,
the Fourth Circuit did not face itself with that issue.'99
The Levin opinion goes into considerable detail distinguishing two other cas-
es involving retroactive application of arbitration clauses, Zink v. Merrill Lynch, a
Tenth Circuit case, and Hendrick v. Brown & Root, a case out of a Virginia federal
district court.200 In doing so, the Levin court further muddied the waters on the
issue. The distinction boiled down to the difference between contracting parties
who have an "ongoing relationship," and those who do not.201 Zink represented
the former, in which a bond salesman and his client executed a formal account
agreement one year and six months after the account was opened.202 The court in
Zink found the dispute arising out of the initial bond purchase to be arbitrable
pursuant to the terms of the later agreement. 203 It is important to note the reasons
for which the Levin court distinguished Zink from Hendrick, a case in which an
arbitration agreement was found to not be retroactively applicable. 204 The facts in
Hendrick showed a "stop-and-go" relationship between the parties, where a con-
tractor was hired for different jobs over the course of several years. 205 The Fourth
Circuit in Levin found that the facts in the case before it were more similar to
those in Zink than in Hendrick, and held that because Levin and Alms & Associ-
ates had an "ongoing relationship," and the dispute concerned events that were
"part and parcel" of the relationship, the arbitration agreement should apply retro-
actively. 206 But were they right?
There may not be a clear answer, because the facts of Levin place it squarely
in between the other two cases. On one extreme (Zink), the parties had a true
stop-and-go relationship.207 On the other (Hendrick), the parties executed a single
contract pertaining to their relationship. 208 Levin is very different from both of
these cases, in that the parties executed contracts annually.209 The court in Levin
found that the relationship was renewed "seamlessly," which may be true, but the
facts do not indicate that the relationship would have continued had the annual
197. Id; Levin, 634 F.3d at 266.
198. Levin, 634 F.3d at 266-67.
199. Id. at 267.
200. Zink v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 13 F.3d 330 (10th Cir. 2006); Hendrick v. Brown
& Root, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 1999).
201. Levin, 634 F.3d at 269.
202. Zink, 13 F.3d at 331.
203. Id. at 333.
204. Hendrick, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
205. Id. at 528-29.
206. Levin, 634 F.3d at 269.
207. Hendrick, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 528-29.
208. Zink, 13 F.3d at 331.
209. Levin, 634 F.3d at 261.
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contracts not been executed.210 Instead, by implication, they indicate the relation-
ship would not have continued, given the fact that the parties executed the annual
contracts at all. If however, the renewals were "seamless," it still does not solve
the issue of whether an integration clause buried in a contract will bind a party
retroactively to the arbitration agreement on its face. Is it reasonable to believe
that after signing annual contracts in each of three years, the arbitration agreement
in the fourth would bind Levin to arbitration? Through the lens of the federal
policy favoring arbitration, the Fourth Circuit thought so, which raises another
issue: should a federal presumption affect traditional understandings of mutual
assent? How vague can parties be when executing contracts that bind each other
to arbitration? With Levin, the floor has been lowered.
By mechanically applying precedent under the umbrella of federal policy fa-
voring arbitration, the Fourth Circuit, in Levin, may very well have interpreted the
contract as the parties intended. However, unlike its analysis of the divestiture
issue, it failed to take into consideration the impact its decision will have on the
future of how parties submit to arbitration. In any case, Levin reinforces an im-
portant piece of wisdom all should take into account when entering into written
agreements: always read thefineprint.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Levin, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals resolved two separate and dis-
tinct issues.211 First, it imposed a rule of automatic divestiture of jurisdiction of
district courts following an appeal from a denial to compel arbitration, safeguard-
ed against abuse with an exception for frivolous appeals. 212 Second, it found that
a contract containing an arbitration agreement and an integration clause should be
applied retroactively to all disputes between the parties that arose throughout the
course of their dealings. 213 However, the court's decisions on these two issues
should not be viewed as narrowly as stated above, as their impact will surely be
far-reaching.
In reaching these decisions, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals drew fre-
quently upon "the federal policy favoring arbitration," 214 the "arbitrability pre-
sumption,"215 and the "purposes of arbitration." 2 16 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit
established a broad precedent, extending beyond divestiture of jurisdiction and
arbitration agreements and integration clauses that strongly emphasizes the favor-
able light under which federal courts view arbitration.
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